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Abstract 
In this study we are examining the validity of relationship between level of taxation and 
democracy, using a panel-model approach. The data-set covers the period 2002-2008, including 
51 states. The main finding stresses that the assumed function are nonlinear, and has a quadratic 
U-shape.  
 
Key words: Taxation, Democracy, Nonlinearity, Dynamic Panel  
 
JEL classification: D70, H20, C33 
 
Introduction 
 
From fiscal point of view, the state collects the taxes and allocates them in order to fulfil the 
three musgravians’ functions in economy: allocation, distribution, and economic stabilization. In 
this context, the power to tax is a very important thing in a democracy. Farmer and Lyal (1994) 
consider power to tax as one of the most basic and jealously guarded prerogative of the state, in 
order to assure the state revenues, and to be an instrument of economic management. For 
Brennan and Buchanan (2006), practically, the power to tax is the power to take. Based on the 
social contract, the government may use the tax revenues for financing the public goods or 
different transfers that citizen-taxpayers desire. Political regime - democratic or autocratic - has, 
in this case, an important implication on taxation, especially regarding the level of tax revenue as 
a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
Democracy has a lot of definitions. In a simplistic way, according to Vanhanen (2003), 
democracy means free popular elections to fill positions of power, while Welzel (2007) defines 
democracy by constitutional constraints on the power of the state, and by popular control over it.  
The autocracy is the opposite concept of democracy: the government in which one person has 
uncontrolled or unlimited authority over others. It’s important to note that in many situations, as 
Tullock (1987) shows, the autocracy can become electoral.    
This paper studies the impact of democracy on the level of taxation, using a panel-model 
approach. The data-set covers the period 2002-2008, including 51 states. On the one hand, the 
main finding stresses that the assumed function are nonlinear, and has a quadratic U-shape. On 
the other hand, the analysis covers the “gap” in the literature in the field.  
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Even if the literature is relatively poor, there are three main different directions regarding the 
results of the connection between the level of taxation and the intensity of democratization: (a) 
the strong democracy determines a high level of taxation (De Schweinitz, 1964; Cheibub; 1998; 
and Boix, 2001); (b) the strong autocracy has a high level of taxation (Downs, 1960; Olson and 
McGuire, 1996; Niskanen, 2003; and Tonizzo, 2008); and (c) there is no any significant 
relationship between taxation and democracy (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; and Profeta et al., 
2009).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the literature review. Section 3 
presents the methodology, and the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
Literature review 
 
The relationship between the level of taxation and the intensity of democratization was less 
investigated in the literature. However, there are authors that claim the existence of this 
connection, but with different directions, while others stress that there is no any significant 
correlation. 
De Schweinitz (1964) promotes the idea that the taxation and democratization’s level are strong 
connected, and have the same direction. He considers democracy inevitable associated with a 
high level of taxation, because the democracy must satisfy pressure for immediate consumption, 
which are stronger then in autocracy. Cheibub (1998) performed a cross-country regression. 
Regarding taxation, its results illustrate that the autocracy has no any advantage compared with 
democracy. In this case, the autocracy is not associated with high level of taxation. In the same 
way, Boix (2001) finds a relationship between the government size and the type of political 
regime. He argues that government budgets (tax collected, and allocations) under democracy 
tend to grow faster then under autocracy. 
Other authors defend the existence of the connection, but with a contrary sign. Downs (1960) 
shows that under democracy the budget tends to be systematically lower, because the 
government allocates the resources in a suboptimal way. McGuire and Olson (1996) reveal that 
higher level of taxation can be observed in autocracy. In such a situation, the resources are used 
for private consumption, and not to provide quality public goods. Niskanen (2003) finds that 
autocracy are more likely to rise the tax, but spending the resources in a discretionary way, while 
Tonizzo (2008) illustrates that strong democratic countries have a low size of government, and 
consequently low tax burden. 
Finally, the last opinions promote the idea that there is no any evidence regarding the 
relationship between taxation and democracy. For Meltzer and Richard (1981) it is impossible to 
predict if democracy or autocracy will lead to a bigger government size, and more progressive 
form of distribution. Similarly, Profeta et al. (2009) do not find any significant within-country 
effect of democracy and civil liberties on corporate taxes, indirect taxes, and social security 
contributions. 
In this context, we find some new evidence regarding the relationship between the level of 
taxation and the intensity of democratization, using a panel-model approach, with 51 states, for 
the period 2002-2008.  
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Methodology and results 
 
In order to investigate the relationship between taxation and democracy, we consider three 
variables: the level of taxation, as dependent variable, the Combined Polity Score, and the GDP 
per capita, as independent variables. The data-set includes 51 countries, covering the period 
2002-2008 (Table 1, in Appendix). The countries were selected using a several criteria such as: 
level of economic development, form of socioeconomic system, culture, and type of political 
regime.  
(a) The level of taxation (tl) illustrates the amount of tax revenues as percentage of GDP. This 
indicator measures how much of GDP is collected by government for its functions. Low level of 
indicator shows a reduced intervention of government in economy trough taxation. The data has 
taken from World Bank online data-base. 
(b) The Combined Polity Score (d) measures the intensity of democratization, as a result of 
unified polity scale ranges. The maximum level is +10 (strongly democratic), and minimum level 
is -10 (strongly autocratic). The data has taken from Marshall et al. (2010). 
(c) The GDP per capita (cg) was introduced as a control variable, and represents the GDP in US$ 
divided by midyear population. The source of the data is World Bank online data-base. 
The main hypothesis of this analysis is that the level of democratization determines the level of 
taxation, based on a function with this shape: 
 
)(dflt = ,                                                                   (1) 
   
where tl - the amount of tax revenues as percentage of GDP, and d - the Combined Polity Score. 
In order to study this function, we consider a panel-data model, using several scenarios (Table 2, 
in Appendix).  
The basic OLS naiv model is as follows: 
 
ititit
t dl εβα ++= ,                                                          (2) 
 
where α - intercept, β - slop,  i - country, t - time and remainder, and itε  - the error term, which 
varies over both country, and time.  
In the case of model 1, the results of Ramsey’s Reset Tests, assuming square and cube, cube 
only, and square only, suggest a nonlinear relationship between the level of taxation and the level 
of democratization, by square type. More, we introduced a control variable - cg (GDP per capita), 
according to Berch (1995), Lowery (1987), and Dennis et al. (2009). The authors consider that 
the voters with high incomes are willing to accept high level of taxation. Based on this 
correction, the model becomes: 
  
it
c
ititit
t gddl εβββα ++++= 3221 .                                           (3) 
 
In relation (3), the error term itε
 
can be written: 
 
itiit µλε += ,
                                                             
(4) 
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where iλ - constant across individuals, and itµ - normally distributed error, or in other 
words ),0( 2µσµ Nit ≈ . 
We can consider two types of panel model in this case: 
(a) Fixed-effects model, with this shape: 
 
it
c
ititiit
t gddl µβββλα +++++= 3221)( ,                                       (5) 
 
where iλ - part of constant, but varies by individual, and 
(b) Random-effects model, which can be specified as follows: 
 
)(3221 iticitititt gddl µλβββα +++++= ,                                      (6) 
 
where iλ - part of error term (error variances varying across groups and/or times). 
 
As the panel-data model may have heterogeneity in data, we analyzed this propriety in both cases 
of fixed, and random effects panel-models’ types. First, we performed the hypothesis tests to 
choose between pooled model and fixed-effects models (cross-section and period), respectively 
random-effects models. Second, we study the hypothesis tests to choose between fixed-effect 
models and random-effect models.  
The null hypothesis of no cross-sectional heterogeneity is rejected with F-statistic 
F(50,303)=78.15 (p-value=0.00), while the null hypothesis of no time-dimension heterogeneity 
is not rejected for all significance levels (F-statistic F(6,347)=0.21, and p-value=0.97). F-tests 
allow that cross-sectional fixed model 3 is preferred to the pooled model 2, while this last model 
is better then the period fixed-effects model 4. 
The Breusch-Pagan test for the random-effects has the Chi-square=889.09, with p-value=0.00, so 
the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional heterogeneity is rejected. The random model 5 is 
preferred to the pooled model 2.  
Finally, for the random-effects models 5, and 6, in both cases, the Hausman tests, with a Chi-
square=3.607928 (p-value=0.307), respectively 1.237621(p-value=0.7440), suggest that these 
models are preferred to fixed-effects models 3, and 4. 
In consequence, a residual test for AR(1) serial autocorrelation is performed for the models 5, 
and 6. The null hypothesis test that idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated is rejected in 
both cases, with a Chi-square=13808.63 (p-value=0.00), respectively 12138.43 (p-value=0.00). 
The autocorrelation coefficient should be -0.51. Based on these results, the estimations must be 
performed with the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors.  
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest, in this context, an estimation using generalized method of 
moments (GMM), with Arellano-Bond 1-step estimator, lagged endogenous variables, and white 
standard errors and covariance. 
The estimation of the new model 7 can be written as: 
 
 itit
c
ti
t
ititit
t glddl µββββ ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆
− 41,3
2
21 .                              (7) 
  
                                                            
1
 According to EViews 7 Users Guide II, p.661. 
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Attached J-statistic test of the model shows that de null hypothesis that the model is valid cannot 
be rejected. The instrument rank of 32 is greater than the number of estimated coefficients 4. 
Therefore, the last model can be considered representative and stable to describe the relationship 
between the level of taxation and the level of democratization.  
The empirical results, in the case of 51 investigated countries, allow that all considered 
determinants have significant, and positive impact on taxation. Moreover, the second derivative 
of the function )( itdf ∆ , in respect to the level of democratization, is positive: 
 
02')'()('' 2 >=∆=∆ βittit ldf                                                   (8) 
 
Thus, there is a minimum level of considered function, with a quadratic U-shape, in respect to 
the level of democratization. This means that, in dynamic approach, the level of taxation depends 
by its historical values, and GDP per capita levels, having the same signs. A high increase of 
taxation’s level can be obtained only in a strong democratic or autocratic regime. Also, the 
empirical results reveal that there is a minimal level of taxation’s dynamic, which corresponds to 
a given democratic trend.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In dynamic, democratization’s level has a significant impact on the amount of taxation, which 
can depend by its historical values, and GDP per capita levels. Having a quadratic U-shape, the 
function between taxation and democracy allows that only a strong democratic or autocratic 
country is compatible with high increase in the level of taxation.  
A strong democracy is a political regime in which the voters realize the importance of social 
contract, the political participation and competition are high, and the public institutions have a 
good quality. In these states, the voters agree to pay high taxes because the public goods received 
have best quality. Even if the level of taxation is growing, the payment of taxes is the result of 
voters’ respect for the public institution. 
Similarly, the same effect can be obtained in a strong autocracy. In this political regime, the 
payment of taxes is not a result of the “acceptance” of social contract, but the results of voters’ 
constrain. The collected resources do not have any correspondent in the public goods, more of 
them following a private destination. To cling to power, the autocrat political regime needs 
higher financial inputs, while the taxpayers tend to avoid taxation.  
In the context of tax policy implications, the study suggests that a significant increase of taxes, 
without a major negative reaction of taxpayers, can be facile obtained if the political regime is 
strong democratic or, per a contrario, strong autocratic.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1: List of analyzed countries 
 
No. States 26 Italy 
1 Australia 27 Kazakhstan 
2 Austria 28 Kenya 
3 Bangladesh 29 Kuwait 
4 Belarus 30 Latvia 
5 Belgium 31 Lebanon 
6 Bhutan 32 Mauritius 
7 Bulgaria 33 Morocco 
8 Canada 34 Nepal 
9 Chile 35 Netherlands 
10 Croatia 36 Norway 
11 Czech Republic 37 Peru 
12 Denmark 38 Philippines 
13 Egypt 39 Poland 
14 El Salvador 40 Portugal 
15 Estonia 41 Romania 
16 Finland 42 Seychelles 
17 France 43 South Africa 
18 Georgia 44 Spain 
19 Germany 45 Sri Lanka 
20 Ghana 46 Sweden 
21 Greece 47 Uganda 
22 Guatemala 48 Ukraine 
23 Hungary 49 United Kingdom 
24 Iceland 50 United States 
25 Israel 51 Uruguay 
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Table 2: Regression results regarding the impact of democracy on taxation 
 
Dependent variable: tl (tax as % in GDP) 
Independent 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
OLS naïve OLS FE:CS FE:PE RE:CS RE:PE GMM - Dynamic 
Constant 
α 
16.48491***
[40.94631] 
(0.0000) 
13.81915***
[25.34893] 
(0.0000) 
16.16501***
[26.15379] 
(0.0000) 
13.85551***
[25.19381] 
(0.0000) 
15.64798***
[15.94673] 
(0.0000) 
13.81915***
[25.17920] 
(0.0000) 
 
d 
0.203776***
[5.321473] 
(0.0000) 
0.352926***
[6.048616] 
(0.0000) 
0.095251 
[1.407963] 
(0.1602) 
0.356183***
[6.049645] 
(0.0000) 
0.147868** 
[2.412050] 
(0.0164) 
0.352926***
[6.008115] 
(0.0000) 
1.284540***
[8.158341] 
(0.0000) 
d2  
0.005641***
[4.595459] 
(0.0000) 
0.001677 
[1.413889] 
(0.1584) 
0.005786***
[4.655202] 
(0.0000) 
0.002565** 
[2.373533] 
(0.0182) 
0.005641***
[4.564688] 
(0.0000) 
0.031424***
[11.01584] 
(0.0000) 
t(-1)       
0.697729***
[32.44917] 
(0.000000) 
cg
 
 
6.74E-05*** 
[3.549925] 
(0.0004) 
4.67E-05*** 
[2.766866] 
(0.0060) 
6.32E-05*** 
[3.226422] 
(0.0014) 
5.27E-05*** 
[3.304600] 
(0.0010) 
6.74E-05*** 
[3.526156] 
(0.0005) 
3.01E-05** 
[2.229741] 
(0.0266) 
Model summary 
R-squared 0.073876 0.184304 0.941302 0.187322 0.04742 0.184304  
F-statistic 28.31688 (0.000000) 
26.58642 
(0.000000) 
91.67886 
(0.000000) 
8.887029 
(0.000000) 
5.857566 
(0.000651) 
26.58642 
(0.000000)  
Akaike 
criterion 6.500648 6.384883 4.033366 6.41479    
Schwarz 
criterion 6.522372 6.428331 4.619914 6.52341    
Hannan-
Quinn 6.509289 6.402164 4.266662 6.457993    
Ramsey 
RESET 
Test: 
(1) F-
statistic 
(square and 
cube) 
21.710660 
(0.00000)       
(2) F-
statistic 
(cube only) 
34.071292 
(0.00000)       
(3) F-
statistic 
(square 
only) 
35.135932 
(0.00000)       
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Cross-
section F   
78.152124 
(0.000000)     
Cross-
section Chi-
square 
  
939.491589 
(0.000000)     
Period F    0.214756 (0.9720)    
Period Chi-
square    
1.323216 
(0.9704)    
Breusch-
Pagan test     
889.09 
(0.000000)   
Hausman - 
test     
3.607928 
(0.3070) 
1.237621 
(0.7440)  
Idiosyncratic 
random     0.0789 1  
Residual test 
for AR(1):  
Chi-square 
    
13808.63 
(0.000000) 
12138.43 
(0.000000)  
J-statistic       36.667640 
Instrumental 
rank       32 
(a) […] denotes the t-stat, while (…) shows the attached probability; 
(b) FE:CS, FE:PE, RE:CS, and RE:PE denote cross-section fixed-effects, period fixed-effects, cross-section 
random-effects, respectively period random-effects.  
(c) ***, **, and *   denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level of significance, respectively.  
 
